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Abstract: The intellectual discourse of any state can function within two broad paradigms: consensual 
and pluralistic. In the first case, political elites, intellectuals, and the public agree on the base parameters 
of what constitutes “the good life” and argue about the methods of application. In the second case, par-
ticipants hold radically different, incommensurable views, which coexist in society. This essay argues that 
the Western political system broadly rests on the politics of liberal consensus, formed throughout the period 
of capitalist modernization. But Russia’s history took a different turn, following a path of alternative mod-
ernization. This engendered the politics of paradigmatic pluralism, in which a number of radically different 
politico-intellectual frameworks struggle for the dominant discourse. This essay examines these paradigms 
and argues that, due to the nature and substance of these models, fundamental change of Russia’s dom-
inant discourse, along with its main politico-institutional parameters, is unlikely. 
Russia’s extant political system is stabilized 
through the politics of paradigmatic pluralism. 
More specific, two broad and radically different 
paradigms of “the good life” are present in Russia: 
pro-Western liberal and state-centered traditional-
ist.1 Their mutual questioning and criticism allow 
society to function within a relatively stable frame-
work. While the two alternatives have struggled for 
discursive supremacy, the nativist and state-centered 
paradigm has emerged as a hegemonic discourse, 
with the support of the majority of the population. 
It is focused on avoiding shocks to the extant system 
and on sustaining sociopolitical stability. This essay 
demonstrates that the paradigmatic split in Russia 
has been historically determined. It continues with 
an examination of the main dimensions of Russia’s 
hegemonic discourse, pointing to its general incli-
nation toward national reconciliation and political 
stability. It then ponders the potential breakdown of 
the dichotomous nature of the existing ideological 
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landscape and assesses the chances of a 
third, more radical alternative capturing 
the field. The essay concludes that, with-
in the period under review, a fundamen-
tal change of the hegemonic paradigm in 
Russia is unlikely due to the dynamics of 
Russia’s political system.
Until very recent years, the Western po-
litical system has mainly rested on the 
politics of liberal consensus. This implies 
that society reaches a basic agreement on 
the idea of the good life within a liberal 
framework and hopes that there will be a 
gradual “step-by-step convergence of all 
values with liberal values.”2 John Rawls 
called to establish a “base consensus” that 
would rest on liberal democratic, cultur-
al, and political notions and act as a basic 
framework capable of encompassing di-
verging but “reasonable” ideas of the good 
life, thus buttressing pluralism of a liber-
al nature.3 This thinking has its origins in 
the monistic tradition of Plato and Aristo-
tle that subsequently merged with mono-
theistic Christian conceptions to determine 
much of ensuing Western philosophy.4 
Critics of consensus politics represent 
a less practiced alternative that calls for 
the coexistence of incommensurable par-
adigms of the good life, their incessant di-
alogue, and mutual enrichment. This is the 
intellectual posterity of Thomas Hobbes, 
David Hume, and John Stuart Mill, ad-
vanced in the twentieth century by Isaiah 
Berlin, John Gray, Jean-François Lyotard, 
Shmuel Eisenstadt, Bernard Williams, and 
others. These critics point to the “absolu-
tization” of liberalism by the proponents 
of liberal consensus politics and advo-
cate the need to introduce meaningfully 
different alternatives that could enrich 
the cultural landscape of society. In short, 
consensus politics seek to operate within 
one broad politically liberal episteme that 
houses divergent ideas of an invariably lib-
eral coloring. Pluralistic politics, in turn, 
have a number of epistemes that struggle 
to agree on the “base” positions, that pro-
pose meaningfully different ideas of socio-
political development, and that compete 
for hegemony in the discursive realm. 
A paradox of contemporary Russian 
politics is that, since the fall of the Soviet 
Union, it has rested on the pluralistic, rath-
er than the consensus, model, with conse-
quences for the country’s intellectual land-
scape and potential for change to its extant 
regime. We shall address the participants 
in these debates as critical intelligentsia. To 
clarify positions at the outset, we will not 
limit our understanding of critical intelli-
gentsia to those who are hopeful of altering 
Russia’s extant political system. Rather, 
the discussion considers all those who 
ponder Russia’s fate–her past, present, 
and future in its full complexity–as intel-
lectuals. Hence, the account examines the 
full spectrum of existing opinion, regard-
less of its support or criticism of the exist-
ing political structure. 
The two main paradigms of the good 
life–pro-Western liberal and state-cen-
tered traditionalist–struggle for position 
as Russia’s hegemonic discourse. The first 
intellectual group, which includes some 
members of the government and finan-
cial elite, advocates the path of westerni-
zation for Russia. The second group adopts 
a conservative approach insisting on the 
creation of a strong state that relies on pre-
vious periods of Russia’s history and her 
idiosyncratic political traditions. This par-
adigm has a pro-Western dimension, but 
it is a particular kind of westernization. It 
welcomes almost all aspects of Western 
modernity related to the capitalist econo-
my, nation-state, religion, and family, but 
is skeptical about the West’s postmod-
ernist path. It also insists on Russia being 
Western and European but not subordi-
nate to the West geopolitically. Although 
the pro-Western liberal paradigm is readily 
available in the current political climate in 
146 (2)  Spring 2017 3
Elena  
Chebankova
Russia, it functions merely as a discursive 
alternative, not as a meaningful option se-
riously considered by the majority of the 
population. Permanent dialogue between 
the two paradigms, as well as the fact that 
the traditionalist discourse already con-
tains some elements of the Western sys-
tem, stabilizes the traditionalist discourse 
and makes unexpected shifts in the coun-
try’s political trajectory unlikely. 
The paradigmatic split and the difficulties 
experienced by the pro-Western liberal par-
adigm are rooted in history; things become 
clearer if we sketch Russia’s past three hun-
dred years. First, Russia has a complex rela-
tionship with modernity, a social paradigm 
that largely lends a liberal consensus matrix 
to the politics of most Western European 
states. Russia is a second-wave moderniza-
tion country, a circumstance that predeter-
mines the paradigmatic split. Second, Rus-
sia’s idiosyncratic relationship with moder-
nity barred her from forming a clear civic 
identity supportive of liberal consensus pol-
itics. Finally, Russia’s tumultuous twentieth 
century further contributed to the consol-
idation of the existing intellectual rift. Let 
me elaborate on these factors.
Russia’s embrace of Western modernity 
was rather tardy. The Petrine period (1682–
1721) was a watershed, during which Russia 
had only just launched a painful transfor-
mation toward modernity, met with resis-
tance from a reluctant population. In con-
trast, most European countries had already 
experienced the Reformation and Enlight-
enment. Russia also lagged behind in in-
dustrialization. Western European coun-
tries underwent the peak of industrializa-
tion during the late eighteenth and most 
of the nineteenth centuries. Russia, in con-
trast, industrialized during the late Tsarist 
period and in the first half of the twentieth 
century, part of the Soviet “alternative mo-
dernity” paradigm. 
In general terms, countries that expe-
rienced modernization in the second or 
third wave have faced the painful politi-
cal consequences of ideological borrow-
ing. A borrowed idea can be “an asset to 
the development of a country and a re-
minder of its comparative backwardness, 
that is both a model to be emulated and a 
threat to national identity. What appears 
desirable from the standpoint of progress 
often appears dangerous to national in-
dependence.”5 Hence, this cruel dilemma 
forces a split within the intellectual scene 
of second-wave industrialization states, of 
which Russia is part. 
Intellectuals of those countries inevita-
bly face an uneasy choice between losing 
intellectual and cultural independence by 
admitting their backwardness and adopting 
the externally borrowed progressive para-
digm, or reaffirming nativism and tradi-
tion by holding on to the previously cho-
sen path. The drama for Russian intellectu-
als is in the quandary of either adopting the 
ideology of individual freedom and bour-
geois liberties, combined with embracing 
Western ontology, or clinging to the idio-
syncratic centralized modes of governance 
that could conduct modernization and de-
velopment, albeit in a risky alternative fash-
ion. The latter option remains less explored, 
a problem that political scientist Alexander 
Dugin described as the need for the devel-
opment merger between distinctively Rus-
sian epistemology and ontology.6 
Further, Russia’s complex experience 
with modernity impedes the process of 
forging a civic national identity, which 
also requires a bourgeois ideological con-
sensus. Bourgeois elites that took the lead 
in creating the “imagined communities” 
of civic nation-states promoted the ideas 
of citizenship and society (Gesellschaft) at 
the expense of the traditional commune 
(Gemeinschaft); civil (economic), political, 
and social rights; individual liberty; civ-
ic responsibility; and representative de-
mocracy. These notions gradually formed 
the cornerstone of the liberal bourgeois 








base consensus, upon which most modern 
Western European societies rest. Hence, 
the idea of civic identity, as well as the civ-
ic nation-state, is closely related to the cap-
italist mode of production and its support-
ing political institutions. It also represents 
the cardinal feature of modernity. 
Russia’s path of “alternative modernity,” 
engendered by Soviet Communism, fea-
tured a different set of values. Bourgeois 
individual liberties were replaced by the 
supremacy of community over the individ-
ual, the idea of liberating masses of work-
ers in order to dispense with exploitation 
and enable fairer participation in the life of 
the community. Equality was understood 
as social equality, which differed from the 
Western understanding of equality of op-
portunity. From this point of view, Russia’s 
alternative modernity has not created a so-
cial fabric with an immanent understand-
ing of civic identity and civic nation that 
rests on the notions of bourgeois individu-
ality, liberal rights, and personal freedoms. 
This hinders a liberal base consensus and 
lends credence to the nativist state-cen-
tered discourse.
Therefore, while we can successfully 
identify the Russian state and Russian peo-
ple, we struggle to pinpoint the dimen-
sions of Russia’s civic identity.7 It comes as 
no surprise that 43 percent of respondents 
to a 2011 vtsiom (Russian Public Opin-
ion Research Center) poll did not feel like 
part of the Russian nation and 20 percent 
could not understand the very idea of na-
tion. Only 37 percent of respondents felt 
like part of the nation.8 Hence, in order to 
embrace a Western consensus matrix, Rus-
sia would first need to adopt a civic identi-
ty based on the ideas of individual liberty 
and a bourgeois nation-state. Russia would 
next need to embrace modernity’s frame-
work of capitalism and liberal base con-
sensus, and then enter the era of postmo-
dernity, with its global civil society and the 
gradual fading of national identity. 
Finally, Russia’s two major national ca-
tastrophes of the twentieth century exac-
erbate paradigmatic differences. The first 
state collapse followed Russia’s entry to 
World War I, which resulted in the fall of 
the monarchy, disintegration of the empire, 
and subsequent (Bolshevik) October Rev-
olution. The second major social catastro-
phe followed the fall of the Soviet Union. 
The demise of the erstwhile Soviet Empire 
completed the unfinished disintegration of 
the Russian Empire, the remains of which 
the Communists managed to reassemble 
in the course of the 1921–1923 Civil War. 
These two major events contributed to the 
significant dealignment of Russian and So-
viet societies, involving transformations of 
all societal cleavages, as well as the recon-
sideration of all preexisting cultural codes 
and behavioral patterns. Twice in the twen-
tieth century Russia experienced the break-
down of historic myths, demoralization of 
society, decline in interpersonal and insti-
tutional trust, and a significant drop in civ-
ic responsibility. The liberal paradigm pre-
sided over the March 1917 Romanov abdi-
cation, the February Revolution of 1917, and 
the 1991 disintegration of the ussr. 
It has now become clear that Russia’s idio-
syncratic relationship with modernity and 
the particularities of its twentieth-century 
history make the politics of paradigmatic 
pluralism almost inevitable. This predic-
ament determines the nature of Russia’s 
political discourse, both the hegemonic 
and the alternative. It is strategically im-
portant that Russia’s elite allow a dialogue 
among the alternative discourses, while 
subtly marginalizing those that lie outside 
the state-endorsed dominant discourse. 
Moreover, the state does not try to reach a 
consensus between liberals and traditional-
ists, and thus fully embraces the existing di-
vide within society. Various ideological al-
ternatives appear on television, radio, and 
in print. Radical liberals, foreign journal-
ists, and advocates of 1990s-style policy are 
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daily participants in Russia’s main political 
talk shows. Yet pro-state conservatives usu-
ally outnumber and dominate them. 
Pro-Western liberal ideas therefore ap-
pear peripheral. They act as a reminder 
that radical alternatives are available and 
that such alternatives could pose a threat 
to the extant stability. Hence, high pub-
lic awareness of the neoliberal paradigm 
precludes it from being novel to the Rus-
sian public. Moreover, despite the paradig-
matic pluralism, the 2000s saw the consol-
idation of a hegemonic discourse through 
a significant shift toward a political cen-
ter. Having experienced the state collapse 
and the obliteration of preexisting values 
during the 1990s, contemporary Russians 
are reluctant to embark on radical vicis-
situdes. They lean toward socioeconom-
ic stability at the expense of radical and, 
in particular, pro-Western liberal alterna-
tives. This brings us to the nature of Rus-
sia’s hegemonic discourse.
One cardinal feature of this discourse, 
and a consequence of the immediate 
post-Soviet experience, is that it remains 
open to debate with its counterhegemon-
ic competitors. With the fall of the ussr, a 
peculiar kaleidoscope of radically different 
ideas ranging from overtly pro-Western, 
Euro-Atlantic, socialist, liberal, neoliberal, 
liberal nationalist, civic nationalist, Stalin-
ist, nostalgically Soviet, and even fascist 
emerged in Russia to fill the void of erst-
while Soviet uniformity. Economic de-
pression, along with a wealth of opportu-
nities for rapid enrichment, has become a 
milieu in which such styles, ideologies, and 
movements develop. The need to survive 
this radically pluralistic environment from 
both economic and sociopolitical perspec-
tives taught Russians to be tolerant of par-
adigmatic differences. Hence, post-Soviet 
Russians emerged from the collapse of the 
ussr as pluralistic liberals who welcomed 
radically different alternatives. 
Interestingly, intolerance of beliefs and 
political radicalism is often a feature of 
pro-Western radical liberal circles whose 
views unfortunately do not fit well with 
the inclinations of the majority. This of-
ten results in representatives of the liberal 
wing blaming ordinary people for self-im-
posed servility, a lack of civic conscious-
ness, an absence of respect for liberal prin-
ciples, and disdain for the countries that 
promote such values.9 It is also clear that 
the tactics of radicalizing the discourse im-
pede the chances of a liberal project in Rus-
sia. Critics and sympathizers of the liberal 
cause often appeal to liberal public figures 
by asking them to reconsider their discur-
sive practices. They implore them to aban-
don their Russophobia (or anthrophobia) 
that manifests in shocking journalistic ex-
pressions, as well as political profanations, 
aiming to strike at the heart of Russia’s he-
gemonic discourse. 
These voices–in particular Sergey Kur- 
ginyan, Alexander Prokhanov, and Zakhar 
Prilepin–advise liberals to center them-
selves on Russia, turn to defending the 
country’s interests internationally, and 
abandon the unconditional support of glob-
al oligarchy. These critics argue that the fail-
ure of the liberal project and de-Sovietiza-
tion of Russia occurred not because of the 
nature of the Soviet Union, but because it 
became clear that alternative policies in-
volved the full-scale deconstruction of Rus-
sian society in the interests of Western pow-
ers.10 Simultaneously, critics invoke liberals 
to develop a Russia-centered liberal epis-
temology that could challenge the extant 
political system from all directions with-
out engaging in the destructive practice of 
national self-denial. 
Many moderate liberals accept the need 
to play down their discourse and narrow 
disagreements with traditionalists. Rus-
sia’s great Western philosopher, Alexander 
Herzen, once emphasized his affinity with 
traditionalist Slavophiles: “Like Janus, 








or a two-headed eagle, we looked in op-
posite directions, but one heart beats in 
our breasts.”11 But today, political scien-
tist Sergey Stankevich regrets, “we have 
different hearts. It is our task to find ways 
in which we can rekindle our dialogue in 
a similar fashion to the dialogue between 
Westerners and Slavophiles in the 19th 
century.”12 
Contemporary hegemonic discourse fo-
cuses on three notions: 1) the idea of state 
sovereignty; 2) the ideology of the multi-
polar world; and 3) the idea of national rec-
onciliation. The multipolar world ideology 
bears the concept of state sovereignty at its 
heart. Hence, I will focus on the notion of 
state sovereignty and combine these points. 
Over the past decade, the concept of 
state sovereignty, seen by the capacity for 
political development free from external 
influence, has become the principal unify-
ing factor in Russia. There this idea, much 
in the classical republican and neo-Roman 
fashion, invokes civic solidarity, patriotic 
awareness, and a sense of belonging. 
Hence, the notions of external freedom and 
territorial integrity are unconditional “red 
lines” that Russia’s hegemonic discourse 
is unwilling to relinquish. Russian polit-
ical scientist Viacheslav Nikonov argues 
that only two countries in Europe–Rus-
sia and England–enjoy over five hundred 
years of sovereign independent history.13 
The red lines have been drawn largely by 
Russia’s successful maintenance of its ter-
ritory and ability to shape its future for-
eign and domestic policy over such a long 
period. Painful memories of occasion-
al state collapses further consolidate the 
desire for sovereignty. Proponents of sov-
ereignty use these examples to argue that 
grassroots movements would invariably 
emerge to restore national control over the 
state just as it happened during the Times 
of Trouble–the period between the end of 
the Rurik Dynasty in 1598 and the start of 
the Romanov Dynasty in 1613–and at the 
end of the Russian Civil War.14 
Further, the international atmosphere 
created by the fall of the ussr also raised 
debates about state sovereignty. With the 
collapse, the United States took steps that 
had the potential to shift the internation-
al relations structure toward unipolarity. 
These have included various “humanitari-
an interventions,” “regime changes,” and 
other initiatives used to consolidate Amer-
ica’s global leadership. And while glob-
al institutional structures remained un-
changed, these processes worried Russia’s 
intellectuals and policy-makers. They pon-
dered metaphysical issues invoking ques-
tions over international ethics and the di-
rection in which the contemporary world 
order should evolve. 
Russia’s hegemonic discourse advocates 
a multiplicity of the world’s political forms 
and states’ entitlement to independent de-
velopment. These ideas oppose the Euro- 
Atlantic universalist logic of globalist de-
mocratization. Russia’s minister of foreign 
affairs, Sergey Lavrov, argues that the abil-
ity of states to pursue political cultural dis-
tinctness remains the cornerstone of the 
world’s lasting peace. In his September 
2015 speech to the Russian State Duma, 
he advocated creating a more just, poly-
centric, and stable world order. He claimed 
that imposing a particular developmental 
recipe on weaker countries would increase 
chaos and be met with resistance by many 
states.15 Sergey Kurginyan concurs, argu-
ing that many developing countries under-
go the phase of incipient modernity (dogon-
yayushchii modern), which the postmodern 
West, through its foreign-policy actions, 
dismantles. With this in mind, desover-
eignization of formerly secular sover-
eign states in the Middle East triggers the 
desovereignization dynamic worldwide. 
This has the potential to result in a new 
“global disorder” that suits contemporary 
global capital.16
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A search for national reconciliation is an-
other cornerstone of the hegemonic dis-
course. It may become tempting to claim 
that the search for reconciliation would 
immediately imply a search for a “base 
consensus” and the desire to dispense 
with the politics of paradigmatic plural-
ism. While the construction of a base con-
sensus could significantly overlap with the 
search for reconciliation, they still repre-
sent two qualitatively distinct categories. 
Reconciliation occurs when the two war-
ring parties accept the existing divide and 
move forward on that assumption, mean-
while forgiving each other for transgres-
sions that took place in the fight for preva-
lence. This does not involve forming con-
sensus in ideological terms, which would 
invariably involve the prevalence of one 
ideological paradigm at the expense of 
another. Reconciliation is merely admit-
ting that both sides have different opin-
ions and that there are some issues that 
nevertheless unite them and help them 
move forward. Hence, they remain dif-
ferent albeit united on some consolidat-
ing grounds. 
Those grounds need not be ideological. 
Proponents of reconciliation consciously 
avoid the push toward forming an ideolog-
ical base consensus; neither side should 
dominate. In his November 4, 2015, speech 
to the Congress of Russia’s Compatriots, 
Vladimir Putin insisted that the proposed 
reconciliation should not equate to uni-
formity in views, but rest on spiritual uni-
ty and a sense of belonging to one country 
united by common history and language. 
Indeed, history and attachment to a com-
mon homeland make people equal partic-
ipants of the past glories of the nation and 
members of the same territorial communi-
ty. There is always an appeal to civic loyalty 
and national unity in lieu of more divisive 
ideas such as language, ethnicity, religion, 
or the ideological treatment of particular 
elements of political structures.17
Hence, intellectuals and the general pub-
lic have formed a clear plan for reconcilia-
tion organized around the following points: 
First, they concur with an idea that contem-
porary Russia is a direct inheritor of the So-
viet Union and that most achievements in 
the post-Soviet period stem from Soviet 
times. While the imperial and medieval 
eras made indispensable contributions to 
the development of the Russian state, it was 
the Soviet period that had a decisive impact 
on how contemporary Russia looks today. 
Achievements in science, technology, in-
dustry, medicine, and health care, the idea 
of victory in the Great Patriotic War–all 
derive from the ussr. As does Russia’s cur-
rent social divide between the wealthy and 
poor, a result of the privatization of Soviet 
industrial assets. The Soviet period also 
shapes contemporary Russian anthropol-
ogy and Russia’s collective unconscious. 
With the quest for consumption and a si-
multaneous idealistic vision of reality, Rus-
sians inherited most of their behavioral pat-
terns from Soviet times.18
Second, the public must learn of the trag-
edies of the formative period of the Soviet 
state. This would require the publication of 
the real number of victims from the purges 
of 1921 to 1954. Speculation over the number 
of victims is unacceptable for both ethical 
and political reasons. This part of Russia’s 
history must be accepted as a great trage-
dy and every person who suffered injustice 
must be vindicated. Nevertheless, society 
must not focus solely on tragic episodes 
but also admit positive aspects of the So-
viet experience. Russian journalist Maxim 
Shevchenko has claimed: 
The idiosyncrasy of the Russian Revolution 
lies in the fact that it socially elevated masses 
of Russian people who were previously con-
sidered mere building material for the good 
life of the few. This process encompassed al-
most everything: purges of innocent victims 
as well as great victories and genuine sacrific-
es of the Soviet people. One historical peri-








od contained polar phenomena: monstrous 
bureaucracy resting on the dominance of 
the Communist party and the possibility 
of creating a truly socialist people’s gover-
nance. The Russian revolution gave people 
the chance to construct a qualitatively dif-
ferent idea of equality, and our contempo-
rary principles and ethics are direct inheri-
tors of those ideals.19
Third, the Russian experience of revo-
lution and industrialization must be com-
pared with similar experiences of revolu-
tion, civil war, and industrialization in oth-
er states. The French Revolution and Reign 
of Terror usually figure as benchmarks. Rus-
sian scholars and commentators, including 
Sergey Kurginyan, Vitaly Tretyakov, Nata-
lya Narochnitskaya, and Peter Tolstoy, have 
argued that, despite tragic episodes, French 
people reconciled with the history of their 
revolution, ensuing terror, and the Napo-
leonic wars. These intellectuals also call 
for an examination of the history of rev-
olution and civil war in China, Spain, and 
the United States. They conclude that civil 
wars, conservative reactions, and even ter-
rors follow most revolutions and radical 
transformations worldwide. 
This three-point reconciliation strategy 
reflects a deeply held suspicion that inval-
idating the Soviet experience could inval-
idate Russia’s contemporary order and 
lead to the new redistribution of pow-
er and property or the territorial disinte-
gration of the state. Many dominant-dis-
course thinkers argue that de-Sovietization 
would undo nearly a hundred years of the 
country’s history and lead to the assump-
tion that Russians are not capable of draft-
ing the main structural, cultural, and ideo-
logical dimensions of their future. Hence, 
finding the right balance between admit-
ting to the wrongs of the Soviet period and 
acknowledging its rights becomes para-
mount. Russian media carefully treads that 
line. On the one hand, it denounces Soviet 
purges in almost every political analysis 
program. On the other hand, it recognizes 
Soviet achievements in the spheres of sci-
ence, medicine, education, and ideological 
influence on the outside world. More im-
portant, the increase in the Soviet compo-
nent of the discourse does not undermine 
its westernization. Alexander Zinovyev, the 
late Russian philosopher and émigré of the 
Soviet era, observed this phenomenon as 
early as 2000. He argued that a country like 
Russia would require a strong state with an 
almost Soviet-like bureaucracy to deal suc-
cessfully with its challenges. At the same 
time, the construction of this new state bu-
reaucracy would go hand in hand with in-
creased westernization.20 
Yet this westernization is of a particular 
kind. The postmodern ideological pack-
age promoted by Western powers most-
ly generates skepticism among ordinary 
Russians. Looking at the West, Russians 
lament the growing domination of global 
oligarchy, “humanitarian” interventions 
leading to socioeconomic catastrophes, 
the growing lack of tolerance toward al-
ternative opinions dressed in political cor-
rectness, and the substitution of real de-
bate with media simulacra. In this light, 
Maria Zakharova, the spokeswoman for 
the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
claims that Russia does not reject but up-
holds Western values. Thus, in a contem-
porary world, Russians perceive that their 
nation has become the true defender of the 
ideals that erstwhile defined the period of 
Western liberal modernity.21 
The final question concerns the stability 
of the extant balance between the moderate 
statist and liberal paradigms. How durable is 
their symbiotic coexistence and what could 
a legitimacy crisis, induced by either seri-
ous economic decline or a political succes-
sion, lead to? Here we should consider an 
outcome in which a revanchist and radical- 
chauvinist force dominates the scene. 
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Though unlikely now, such a scenario 
was not a distant possibility throughout 
the past decade. Indeed, a more nuanced 
approach to Russia’s ideological landscape 
would allow the exploration of a third, al-
beit minor, option. This discursive para-
digm is often referred to as “political na-
tionalism” or the “third force.”22 It is fo-
cused on a radical agenda of repudiating 
external and internal enemies and ad-
vancing a project of “greater Russia.” This 
force comprises diverging trends with 
wide-ranging ideological positions. Yet its 
representatives usually acknowledge Rus-
sia’s discursive division of liberals and stat-
ist patriots and blame the Kremlin for be-
ing indecisive in repudiating the liberals.
They invoke the fate of Viktor Yanu-
kovich, ex-president of Ukraine, who si-
multaneously pursued European-integra-
tion and politicoeconomic ties with Rus-
sia. This inconsistency, advocates of the 
third paradigm argue, ultimately led to 
Yanukovich’s demise, and the Kremlin’s 
inconsistency toward domestic liberals 
and the West could result in Russia’s own 
liberal maidan revolution.23 These ideol-
ogists claim that the Kremlin must steer 
toward a “patriotic” trajectory and aban-
don futile attempts to reach a dialogic bal-
ance with the liberals.24 It is unacceptable, 
they claim, both that the statists’ discourse 
contains substantial chunks of liberalism 
and that Russia’s main media channels 
and state socioeconomic policies advance 
these positions. Russia, in their view, must 
adopt a steady line toward the national re-
vival and cease “appeasing” the West by 
openly declaring it as an existential enemy 
rather than a dialogical partner. 
Initially, such a radical approach may 
seem marginal. However, many observ-
ers claim that large segments of Russia’s 
financial, political, and special services 
elite–who come across as liberal or con-
servative in public–had shared in this ide-
ology in private, at least until the Crimean 
and Donbas events.25 In the aftermath of 
the 2005 Ukrainian Orange Revolution, it 
does not come as a surprise that the Krem-
lin viewed the nationalists as a tactical ally 
that could stabilize the extant political sys-
tem and defend it from external interfer-
ence. Therefore, this third cohort is sub-
stantial, uniting members of patriotic, 
liberal, monarchical, and even fascist op-
position. As a political force, nationalists 
divided into two separate categories. The 
first group expected the restoration of the 
Russian Empire and advocated territori-
al expansion. The second wished for the 
creation of an ethnic Russian state and en-
visaged sacrificing some of Russia’s ethnic 
territories in order to see this goal through.
However, this once-promising third 
force, buttressed by the silent support of 
financial elites and special services, grad-
ually began losing its discursive niche. 
Some analysts claim that by 2016, nation-
alists had become so marginalized and 
fragmented that they could not meaning-
fully discuss participation in the forth-
coming parliamentary or regional elec-
tions.26 The emerging rift with the Krem-
lin, disagreements with the liberals, and 
the Crimean crisis all helped alter the dis-
cursive scene in Russia. As for the Krem-
lin, it subsequently sensed the danger asso-
ciated with flirting with nationalists. The 
apparent failure of nationalists to protest 
against the West and their preoccupation 
with internal immigration indicated that, 
instead of protecting Russia’s political re-
gime from Western interference, this rad-
ical force had the potential to turn its guns 
against the Kremlin itself. The first signs of 
rupture between the Kremlin and nation-
alists took place in 2007–2008, when the 
state adopted a range of punitive measures 
against ethnic hatred and extremism. The 
immigration process was systematized, 
the judicial review for racial crimes was 
revised, and the dissemination of xeno-
phobic literature was restricted. Political 








nationalists then fully emerged as a radi-
cal stronghold of the nonsystemic oppo-
sition to the Kremlin. 
Nationalists still had a chance to unite 
with radical liberals and form a single 
front against the statists. This would have 
granted them an opportunity to survive as 
a meaningful discursive paradigm. It does 
not come as a surprise that during the De-
cember 2011 protests, liberals worked with 
nationalists and formed a single anti-Krem-
lin front. The nationalist cohort hoped to 
capitalize on the shortcomings of the Krem-
lin’s policies in the international arena as 
well as on the state’s inability to tackle cor-
ruption and the economic crisis. National-
ists promoted two broad agendas that the 
liberal cohort has generally approved. The 
first agenda focused on the relationship be-
tween Central Russia and the North Cau-
casus and advanced the Stop Feeding the 
Caucasus campaign, which sought to end 
Russian federal government spending on 
the region. The second agenda item was the 
general anti-immigration campaign geared 
toward the introduction of the visa regime 
with the Central Asian republics. 
However, the events in Crimea and Don-
bas turned the tables radically, virtual-
ly obliterating this third discourse. Many 
nationalists initially supported the 2014 
Maidan Revolution, attracted by the fact 
that their Ukrainian equals played a deci-
sive role in the change of the Ukrainian po-
litical regime. Yet they quickly faced disap-
pointment, given that the Ukrainian Revo-
lution took on an anti-Russian ideological 
coloring.27 The subsequent outbreak of 
the bloody conflict in Donbas led these 
nationalists to adopt a radically pro-Rus-
sian agenda, arguing in favor of Russia’s di-
rect military involvement in rescuing the 
“Russian world” in Eastern Ukraine. This 
policy, however, resulted in further disap-
pointment, for the mobilization potential 
of Russian nationalists was minimal and 
they were not able to attract a substantial 
number of volunteers who would agree 
to take up arms for this cause.28 This was 
mainly linked to the fact that Russia’s gen-
eral public was not in favor of the country’s 
direct military involvement in the con-
flict and wished only to support the Rus-
sian population in Eastern Ukraine rhetor-
ically. This led to a significant narrowing of 
the discursive niche in which nationalists 
could engage. 
Further, the political field previously oc-
cupied by the revanchist ideologists has 
been gradually taken over by moderate lib-
erals and statists. Following the failure of 
the December 2011 protests, moderate lib-
erals began appealing to values with social 
currency, praising patriotism, proclaiming 
their “love of the motherland,” and sup-
porting development of the welfare state. 
This trend deepened in the wake of events 
in Crimea. The overwhelming majority of 
Russians backed the Kremlin and by doing 
so squeezed the liberal support base. This 
partly made the liberals accept the advice of 
their statist opponents to soften their stance 
toward the “people.” The statists also in-
tensified their patriotic rhetoric, seeing it as 
a useful tactical instrument in the struggle 
for the dominant discourse. Russian polit-
ical scientist Sergey Karaganov has argued 
that contemporary Russia remained a non-
ideological state, thus adhering to our ini-
tial proposition of paradigmatic pluralism. 
Yet Russia obtained, Karaganov continued, 
the two consolidating ideas of sovereignty 
and defense, which united under the over-
arching notion of “patriotism.”29 This de-
prived nationalists of their habitual play-
ground. 
The fragmentation and weakness of the 
potential third force was demonstrated 
by its proponents’ most recent attempt to 
set aside internal ideological differences 
and unite into a single group. The 25 Jan-
uary Committee, established in 2016, rep-
resents a union of extremely diverse and 
largely incompatible forces. It includes 
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monarchists led by Igor Strelkov, radical 
national democrats represented by Kon-
stantin Krylov, National Bolsheviks led by 
Eduard Limonov, ultra-nationalist fascists 
such as Egor Prosvirnin, and opposition-
ist former security service officers such as 
Anatoly Nesmiyan. This ideologically di-
verse group supports irredentist claims of 
ethnic Russians in the post-Soviet space 
and the idea of establishing an ethnic Rus-
sian state based on the principles of justice, 
legality, and equality. 
Members of the Committee are driven 
by their mutual detest of liberalism and 
the West and the search for internal ene-
mies within the Russian state apparatus. 
The slide of Russia’s third discourse, from a 
formerly promising political force to a mar-
ginalized group of intellectuals with dubi-
ous goals, is perhaps unfortunate for those 
who wished to create a sustainable politi-
cal paradigm within this field and move it 
in a moderate direction. Yet their current 
political weakness suggests that the arrival 
of representatives of this paradigm in the 
highest echelons of Russia’s power is un-
likely, even within the conditions of eco-
nomic and political crisis.
A radical change that could fundamen-
tally alter the political situation in Russia 
seems an unlikely prospect. Extraordinary 
as it may seem, at this point, Russia has 
run out of revolutionaries. First, contem-
porary Russia functions within the con-
ditions of a paradigmatic pluralism that 
makes a vast number of options readily 
available. The presence of different par-
adigms in the mass media and public de-
bate precludes the situation, in which a sys-
tem-deposing paradigm could arrive unex-
pectedly, appearing more just and novel, 
and radically changing the hegemonic dis-
course. Despite the wealth of different para-
digms, the state-centered conservative epis-
teme won the hegemonic discourse; the 
majority of Russia’s population and her 
intellectuals support it. The main stabiliz-
ing feature of this discourse is that it does 
not seek ideological uniformity and wel-
comes various alternatives within the de-
bate on domestic politics. It has little ap-
peal to values and seeks national reconcili-
ation. This discourse is also foreign-policy 
centered and, for that reason, has an overall 
consolidating effect. In addition, it is more 
open to debate than its liberal counterpart, 
which is often intolerant of nonliberal (but 
not illiberal) alternatives. Indeed, pro-West-
ern liberals subconsciously feel that their 
paradigm may prevail only through the full 
and radical recasting of public conscious-
ness that cannot take place overnight or 
even within a short period. 
To realign the system fundamentally, 
one would need to dispense with the pol-
itics of paradigmatic pluralism and in-
still a new consensus, which could only 
be achieved via authoritarian means and 
would go against the grain of popular 
wishes. Considering the decisive liberal 
turn, those who anticipate that a chang-
ing regime in Russia would bear fruit and 
move the country in the direction of full 
integration into the Euro-Atlantic commu-
nity overlook the fact that such a change 
could only be temporary. For this develop-
ment to take full effect and result in a fun-
damental change, Russia would need the 
necessary conditions to form the liberal 
base consensus and move away from the 
politics of paradigmatic pluralism. This 
can only take place gradually through pro-
gressive accumulation of liberal capital-
ist behavioral patterns, a few generations 
of steady development in the modernist 
fashion, and the construction of the main 
dimensions of Russia’s civic nation. The 
fifteen years phase pondered in this vol-
ume thus does not allow sufficient time for 
a fundamental change of this magnitude.
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